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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this case, the State sought to present the testimony of an eleven-year-old girl, 
A.P., who was accusing Emil Mercado of inappropriately touching her. Nothing about 
her demeanor during or after the alleged incident suggested that she would have 
problems giving effective and coherent testimony. In fact, her parents were allowed to 
sit in the gallery during her testimony. Nevertheless, over Mr. Mercado's objection, the 
district court allowed the prosecutor's victim coordinator to sit on the stand with 
A.P. during her testimony. That decision constituted an abuse of discretion because the 
victim coordinator's presence was not necessary to facilitate meaningful, probative 
testimony, and so, only served to vouch for A.P.'s credibility or play on the jury's 
emotions. Therefore, that decision deprived Mr. Mercado of his right to a fair trial before 
an impartial jury. As a result, this Court should vacate Mr. Mercado's conviction and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
As Idaho has not yet defined the scope of the district court's discretion in allowing 
a support person to be present during a witness's testimony, this Court should also take 
this opportunity to provide guidance to the district courts. To that end, it should identify 
the factors the district courts should consider when faced with this issue, so as to 
prevent inconsistent decisions and avoid violations of defendants' right to a fair trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Mercado exercised his right to a jury trial when the State charged him with 
lewd conduct with a person under sixteen years old. He denied the accusations 
1 
entirely. (Tr., Vol.2, p.293, Ls.H)-24.)1 There was evidence supporting his account as 
A.P. had a history of being untruthful with school officials and agents of the Department 
of Health and Weifare. (Tr., Vol.2, p.192, Ls.7-20.) In fact, there was evidence 
discussed pre-trial, though not elicited during the trial itself, that A.P. had made several 
ultimately-unsubstantiated accusations of abuse against her mother. (R., p.68.) 
On the other hand, A.P. asserted that Mr. Mercado had inappropriately touched 
her while she was dozing on his couch. (See Tr., VoU, pp.2-21 (A.P.'s testimony at the 
preliminary hearing); Tr., Vol.2, pp.225-55 (A.P.'s testimony at the trial).) She testified 
that, when she realized what was happening, she told Mr. Mercado that she had to go 
to the bathroom, but instead, went and told Mr. Mercado's wife, Geraldine Shaw, what 
had happened. (Tr., Vol.2, p.238, Ls.15-23.) Ms. Shaw had Mr. Mercado come over 
and A.P. confronted him about the situation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.239, Ls.12-25.) A.P. told one 
of the CARES nurses who subsequently interviewed her that she was crying during tf1is 
confrontation, but she was able to stick to her story while Mr. Mercado asserted that 
nothing happened. (Report of Alisa D. Ortega, NP, dated 1/7/14, attached to 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), no page number provided.) After 
Ms. Shaw had A.P. confront Mr. Mercado, A.P. played computer games with her 
younger sister until her mother came to pick them up. (Tr., Vol.2, p.240, Ls.3-13.) She 
told her mother what had happened, and her mother took her to the Elmore County 
Medical Center. (Tr., Vol.2, p.240, Ls.16-18.) 
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in three independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the 
jury trial and the first part of the sentencing hearing. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume 
containing the second part of the sentencing hearing. 
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Several doctors, nurses, and police officers talked with A.P. about the alleged 
incident. Of those who actually made note of A.P.'s demeanor during those interviews, 
they reported that A.P. was not showing signs of distress. For example, Dr. C. Travis 
Criddle, who examined A.P. the night of the alleged incident, indicated in his triage 
notes that A.P. was "in no apparent distress, well groomed, well nourished, comfortable. 
Behavior is cooperative, quiet." (Report of C. Travis Criddle, dated 12/29/13, entry time 
stamped 17:21, attached to PSI, no page number provided.) Later that evening, he 
again noted A.P. was "quiet, not outwardly emotional. Not in apparent pain or 
respiratory distress." (Report of C. Travis Criddle, dated 12/29/13, entry time stamped 
18:17, attached to PSI, no page number provided.) 
Officer Thomas Mogolich also interviewed A.P. at the medical center. 
(Supplemental Report of Thomas Mogolich, dated 12/30/13, attached to PSI, p.2.) He 
noted that A.P. "was extremely nervous and closed off in the hospital environment," but 
when he took her back home, "I noticed a considerable change in [A.P. and her sister] 
and observed that they were more relaxed and talkative. They seemed to be in a better 
mood." (Supplemental Report of Thomas Mogolich, dated 12/30/13, attached to PSI, 
p.2.) However, A.P. was still able to recount her story to Officer Sierra Jensen, who did 
not make any note, positive or negative, about A.P.'s demeanor. (See generally Report 
of Sierra Jensen, dated 12/30/13, attached to PSI.) Officer Russell Griggs, who 
interviewed A.P. on two separate occasions in the following months, also did not make 
any note about A.P.'s demeanor during his interviews with her. Supplemental Report of 
Russell Griggs, dated 1/9/14, attached to PSI; Supplemental Report of Russell Griggs, 
dated 2/10/14, attached to PSI.) 
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One of the CAl-<ES nurses who interviewed A.P. noted that, despite experiencing 
some mental distress since the alleged incident, A.P. was able to give "good disclosure 
today regarding the sexual abuse." (Report of Alisa D. Ortega, NP, dated 1/7/14, 
attached to PSI, no page number provided.) Another CARES staff member reported 
that AP. "presented a happy demeanor upon leaving CARES by smiling and engaging 
in conversation with the CARES staff." (Report of Erin Craig, dated 1 /3/14, attached to 
PSI, no page number provided.) 
A.P. also testified at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., Vol.1, pp.2-21.) There was no 
indication that she was unable to respond to the questions or was emotional during her 
testimony. ( See generaily Tr., Vol:1, pp.2--21.) However, without an expressed reason, 
a victim coordinator, Dee Enokson, was allowed to sit on the stand with AP. during her 
testimony. (Tr., Vol.1, p.2, Ls.2-6.) The victim coordinator in Elmore County is a part of 
the Elmore County Prosecutor's Office. Victim Assistance County Coordinator 
Contacts, website of the Office of the Attorney General, http://www.ag.idaho.gov/victim-
Assistance/coordinatorContacts_County.html#E (last accessed February 3, 2015) 
(listing the victim assistance county coordinator for Elmore County as "Elmore County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office"). There was no discussion of what relationship, if any, 
Ms. Enokson had with A.P. (See generally Tr., Vol.1.) Mr. Mercado did not object to 
this procedure at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., Vol.1, p.2, Ls.1-6.) 
Despite A.P.'s ability to effectively recount the events of the alleged incident, the 
State requested that A.P.'s mother, who also gave testimony during the trial, be allowed 
to remain in the courtroom during A.P.'s trial testimony, and the district court granted 
that request. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.223, Ls.13-16.) In fact, both A.P.'s parents were in the 
courtroom during A.P.'s trial testimony. (Tr., Vol.2, p.223, Ls.1-2.) 
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Nevertheless, after the district court had granted the request for A.P.'s mother to 
remain in the courtroom, the State also requested that a different victim coordinator, 
Penny Lee, be allowed to sit with A.P. on the stand while A.P. testified. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.222, Ls.21-25.) As before, there was no discussion of what, if any, relationship 
Ms. Lee had with A.P. (See generally Tr., Vol.2, p.222, L.15 - p.225, L.12.) 
Defense counsel objected to the State's request for Ms. Lee to sit with A.P. on 
the stand. (Tr., Vol.2, p.222, L.17.) Specifically, he contended that, because A.P.'s 
parents would already be in the courtroom, allowing any additional person to actually sit 
with A.P. during her testimony would be inappropriate. (Tr., Vol.2, p.222, Ls.15-20.) 
The district court decided, based solely on A.P.'s age (eleven), that Ms. Lee 
would be allowed to sit with A.P. on the stand. (Tr., Vol.2, p.224, Ls.5-7.) Ms. Lee was 
seated between the judge and A.P., but not between A.P. and the jury. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.224, Ls.8-25.) The district court did not instruct Ms. Lee about what she could and 
could not do while sitting behind A.P. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) Similarly, the district 
court did not inform the jury of the reason Ms. Lee was sitting on the stand with A.P., 
nor did it instruct the jury to disregard to her presence. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Mercado guilty as charged. (R., p.141.) The 
district court sentenced him to a unified term of twenty years, with three years fixed, 
which it suspended for a twenty-year period of probation. (R., pp.151-53.) Mr. Mercado 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp .161-63.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing Ms. Lee to sit with A.P. on 
the 'Nitness stand during A.P.'s testimony. 
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ARC3UMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion B{ Allowing Ms. Lee To Sit With A.P. On The 
Witness Stand Durin.9....A.P.'S TestirnoQY 
A. Introduction 
The question of whether to allow a support person to accompany a witness 
during her testimony, while in the discretion of the district court, is still an important one 
to address correctly. The problem is that the support person's mere presence can 
deprive the defendant of this right to a fair trial by playing on the jurors' emotions or 
sympathies or being seen as vouching for the witness's credibility. As the Court of 
Appeals has indicated, behavior "whose only purpose is to encourage the jury to identify 
with the victim [is] not proper.'' State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 908 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2008)); see also State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 
132, 146 (2014) (reiterating that appealing to the passions or prejudices of the jurors 
constitutes misconduct). As such, the line between protecting the defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial before impartial jurors and not subjecting a witness to 
serious emotional trauma that would affect her ability to give meaningful testimony is a 
critical one to walk correctly. This is particularly true in cases such as this, where the 
witness is young and her credibility is a central component of the defense theory. 
Idaho Code § 19-3023 allows for a support person to accompany a child witness 
on the witness stand unless that procedure would infringe on the defendant's 
constitutional rights: 
When a child is summoned as a witness in any hearing in any criminal 
matter, including any preliminary hearing, notwithstanding any other 
statutory provision, parents, a counselor, friend or other person having a 
supportive relationship with the child shall be allowed to remain in the 
courtroom at the witness stand with the child during the child's testimony 
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unless in written findings rnack} and entered, th8 court finds that the 
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial will be unduly prejudiced. 
LC § 19-3023. However, the Legislature provided no framework or guidance for 
weighing the impact on the defendant's rights or for evaluating which of the potential 
support persons (parent, as opposed to a counselor, for example). That code section is 
also inapplicable to the situation where an older witness might need a support person 
during her testimony. Cf Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 674-75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1975) (discussing a situation where a support person was allowed to sit witr1 a twenty-
one-year-old witness after she almost fainted on the stand). 
Idaho's appellate courts have not provided much guidance on this issue either. 
Rather, when the Court of Appeals considered this issue, it has ruled in an ad hoc 
manner, basing its decisions on the particular facts of the cases it was considering. 
See State v. Larsen, ·123 Idaho 456, 459-60 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Cliff, 116 Idaho 
921, 923-24 (Ct App. 1989). It also did not rely on I.C. § 19-3023 in reaching those 
decisions. Rather, in Larsen, the Court of Appeals held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by allowing a support person to be in the courtroom, but not at the 
witness stand, because the district court had instructed the jury to disregard the support 
person's presence. Similarly, in Cliff, the Court of Appeals held that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by allowing the child witness to testify while holding a doll 
because it was a less stringent alternative compared to others the district court might 
have employed. 
In neither case did the Court of Appeals examine the scope of the district court's 
discretion, nor did it explain what other factors that could be relevant to that decision in 
similar contexts. It simply held, on those particular facts, there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has already encountered this sort of situation before. 
See State v. lwakiri, ·105 Idaho 6"18 (1984 ). In that case, Idaho's appellate courts had 
not fully examined the scope of the district court's discretion for allowing a questionable 
procedure when admitting certain testimony, specifically the propriety of allowing 
testimony from a witness after the witness's memory had been refreshed by hypnosis. 
Id. at 621-27. The Idaho Supreme Court decided it would be better for it to define the 
scope of the district court's discretion and identify various relevant factors to guide the 
district courts in the proper exercise of that discretion. See State v. lwakiri, 106 Idaho 
618, 622-26 (1984). 
To inform its decision, the lwakiri Court looked at case law from other 
jurisdictions and considered the rules that had been established over time. Id. at 623. 
It found that several courts had opted for one of two per se rules - one that such 
testimony was always inadmissible, and the other that such testimony was never 
admissible. Id. It also found that other courts had opted for a third rule, which identified 
several factors for the district court to weigh when determining the admissibility of such 
evidence in light of the facts of a particular case. Id. at 624. The Idaho Supreme Court 
pointed out that there is an aversion to adopting per se rules of admissibility, since such 
rules often prevent the trial court from considering relevant, case-specific facts, such as 
the reliability of the evidence. Id. at 624-25. Therefore, it adopted the third rule and 
identified relevant factors so that the district courts would be better able to properly 
exercise their discretion when such cases arose. Id. at 625-26. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court did in lwakiri, this Court should take this opportunity 
to define the scope of the district courts' discretion and identify factors to guide them in 
the exercise of that discretion. As in lwakiri, leaving this matter to the unfettered 
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discretion of the district court will lead to inconsistent decisions in the trial courts, risking 
continued deprivations of defendants' rights to fair trials. An evaluation of other states' 
consideration of this same question reveals severai relevant factors, and they will be 
discussed in depth infra. In light of those factors, the abuse of the district court's 
discretion is clear. However, even if this Court does not take this opportunity to give 
guidance on this issue, the abuse of the district court's discretion is still obvious under 
Idaho's statutes and case law. 
B. Idaho Should Define The Scope Of The District Court's Discretion As Allowing 
A Support Person To Accompan i A Witness After There Has Been A Showing 
That The Witness Has A Substantial Need For The Sup ort Person's Presence, 
Based On The Consideration Of Various Relevant Factors 
As was the case when the Supreme Court considered what guidance to give for 
post-hypnosis testimony, other states have already examined the issue of whether, and 
how best, to allow a support person to be present during a witness's testimony. Those 
courts have developed their own, varying rules to answer that question. Conveniently, 
the Supreme Court of the Northern Mariana Islands recently considered this same 
question and, although its decision has not yet been certified for publication, it clearly 
identified and described the three different rules that other courts have adopted. See 
Northern Mariana Islands v. Santos, 2014 MP 20, 2014 WL 7399262, **3-4 (Dec. 30, 
2014).2 The rules are identified in terms of when, as opposed to how best, to allow a 
support person to be present during a witness's testimony: 
2 It is unclear whether this opinion is simply awaiting formal publication or if it is going to 
remain unpublished. However, that distinction is unimportant for purposes of this 
appeal. It is cited here as an example of a learned court recently engaging in a 
reasoned analysis of the exact issue Mr. Mercado is arguing in this appeal. He 
encourages this Court to join in the reasoned analysis of the Supreme Court of the 
Northern Mariana Islands. 
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(1) The prosecution must establish that the support person's presence is a 
necessity. See, e.g., State v. Suka, 777 P.2d 240, 241 (Haw. 1989); 
(2) The prosecution must show a substantial need for the support person's 
presence. See, e.g., Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088, 1094 (Del. 2008); State 
v. TE., 775 A.2d 686, 697-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 5 2001 ), certif denied; 
People v. Patten, 9 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1731-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), petition for 
rev. denied; and 
(3) The prosecution must show some generalized need for the support person's 
presence. See, e.g., State v. Letendre, ·13 A.3d 249, 255 (N.H. 2011) (refusing 
to set forth specific factors to guide the district court's exercise of discretion); see 
also State v. Rochelle, 298 P.3d 293, 300 (Kan. 2013) (adopting "the New 
Hampshire" approach while identifying several factors that may impact the district 
court's decision).3 
Santos, 2014 WL 7399262, **3-4. However, as the Santos Court noted, all three 
rules agree on one point: "a court must find there is some type of need for the 
accommodation" before it is appropriate for a support person to be present during a 
witness's testimony. Id. at *4. After considering those rules, the Santos Court adopted 
the second approach. See id. at **4-5. This Court should do the same. 
This Court should reject the third approach (the New Hampshire approach) for 
two reasons. First, leaving the matter to the trial court's unfettered discretion will lead to 
inconsistent decisions in the trial courts, risking continued deprivations of defendants' 
rights to fair trials. Second, it is inconsistent with Idaho law. For example, I.C. § 9-1805 
3 Even though they adopted these different tests, several of these states have statutes 
that are similar to I.C. § 19-3023. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 868.5, 868.8; Del. 
Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 5134(b); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 621-28. 
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provides that a child witness rnay oniy give testimony in an alternative manner to live 
testimony before the trier of fact if the district court finds "by clear and convincing 
evidence that the child would suffer serious emotional trauma that would substantially 
impair the child's ability to communicate with the finder of fact .... " LC. § 9-1805 
(emphasis added). By requiring the State to show that the impact on the witness would 
substantially impair this particular witness's ability to testify before the alternative means 
of testimony can be used, the Legislature clearly required a finding of a substantial need 
based on the specific needs of the particular witness. Compare, e.g., T.E, 775 A.2d at 
697-98 (expressly examining I.C. § ·19-3023, finding it consistent with the majority rule, 
and adopting the substantial need test as consistent with that majority rule). 
Similarly, in Cliff, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined the district court had not 
abused its discretion by allowing the witness to hold a doll after the witness's guardian 
ad /item testified that the witness had been showing signs of nervousness, including 
suffering dry heaves, prior to being called to testify. 4 Cliff, 116 Idaho at 923. Thus, the 
justification for allowing the witness in Cliff to hold the doll while testifying was based on 
her specific needs. See id. Both of these examples demonstrate that the district courts 
should be looking at the specific needs of the actual witness in the pending case when 
considering whether to allow a support person to be present during a witness's 
testimony. 
However, the New Hampshire approach would allow the trial court to ignore 
the specific witness's need for support, or lack thereof, and decide the issue based only 
4 The Washington Supreme Court described this as a lower standard than Hawaii's 
necessity test, or even Delaware's version of the substantial need test, labeling it as 
"the record clearly indicated need" test. State v. Dye, 309 P.3d 1192, 1198 (Wash. 
2013). However, as both I.C. § 9-1805 and Cliff indicate, Idaho's test is still more akin 
to the substantial, specific need test than New Hampshire's generalized need test. 
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on generalized or objective factors. See Santos, 2014 WL 7399262, *4. That is 
troubling, since ''the purpose of the accommodation is to protect that individual rather 
than some hypothetical witness. Allowing a decision on only generalized, objective 
factors undermines that objective: a more sensitive witness may lose a necessary 
accommodation while a less sensitive witness gains an unnecessary protection." Id. 
The better rule is to require some showing of specific need, particularly because the 
defendant's constitutional rights are at risk. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
840 Cl 990) (holding that, to overcome the defendant's right to confront witnesses face-
to-face and allow a child-witness to testify via close circuit television, the State must 
make "an adequate showing of necessity," which must be case-specific). Therefore, 
this Court should join the Santos Court in rejecting the New Hampshire approach. 
On the other end of the spectrum is Hawaii's restrictive rule which requires the 
State to show that the support person's presence is a necessity. Suka, 777 P.2d at 
242-43; see also State v. Rutana, 785 P.2d 615, 616-17 (Haw. 1990) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Mueller, 76 P.3d 943, 945 (Haw. 2003)). The Hawaii 
Supreme Court was concerned that "[t]he jury might very well have concluded that [the 
victim coordinator] being present supported complainant's story or re-assured 
complainant's veracity." Suka, 777 P.2d at 242. Additionally, "[t)he jury could very well 
have surmised that [the victim coordinator] had extensive talks with the complainant, 
and/or knows of other information not presented to the jury that convinces [the victim 
coordinator] that complainant is telling the truth." Id. Such a risk, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court determined, was unacceptable, particularly when "[t]here is nothing in the minor 
witness' testimony, either before the court made its preliminary ruling or after she took 
the stand before the jury, which shows a compelling necessity for allowing such a 
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prejudicial scenario. Ru!ona, 785 P .2d at 617. Therefore. to ensure the defendant's 
riqhts were not infringed, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the restrictive "compelling 
necessity'' rule against the use of support persons during a witness's testimony. Id.; 
Suka, 777 P.2d at 243. 
While the Hawaii Supreme Court's goal is certainly laudable and Mr. Mercado 
would expect that this Court shares in its concern for protecting a defendant's 
constitutional rights during trial, he recognizes that Hawaii's restrictive rule might, like 
New Hampshire's overly-permissive rule, prevent the district court from considering all 
the relevant facts of a particular case. It is conceivable that an emotional witness might 
ultimately be able to give testimony, aibeit halting and less-than-clear testimony, without 
a support person, but having a support person would be useful to facilitate meaningful 
or effective testimony from that witness. In such a case, there would be a substantial 
need, but not a necessity, for the support person's presence. However, under Hawaii's 
test, the district court faced with that scenario would abuse its discretion if it were to 
allow the support person to be present during the witness's testimony. 
Thus, this Court, like the Santos Court, should join the states who have adopted 
the middle approach, requiring the trial court to find some substantial, case-specific 
need, based on a consideration of various, relevant factors. See Santos, 2014 WL 
7399262, *4. This rule allows the trial court the discretion to consider both the particular 
witness's needs, and yet, still ensure that the defendant's right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury is protected. See Cliff, 116 Idaho at 924. 
The New Jersey Superior Court's decision in State v. T.E., 775 A.2d 686, is 
"particularly instructive on the issue because it thoroughly considered the competing 
interests of the State, the defendant and the child witness." Czech, 945 A.2d at 1096. 
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Howevcjr, other courts have identified relevant factors that were not cliscussecl in TE; 
as one of those courts noted, "[t]he list of possibilities that might generate an improper 
influence is l!mitiess.··5 Patten, 9 Cal.App.4th at 1732. The following list, derived from 
several of those decisions, is indicative of the factors that are relevant to the decision of 
whether, and how best, to allow a support person to be present during a witness's 
testimony: 
Whether the witness is likely to be able to provide "meaningful, probative 
testimony" without the support person, or whether she is likely to be "substantially 
non-responsive[.]" TE., 775 A.2d at 697; 
vVhether the support person is related to the witness. An unrelated counselor or 
therapist, as opposed to a family member, is more likely to inappropriately impact 
the jury. "A representative of the prosecutor's office should not be used.''6 
TE., 775 A.2d at 698 (emphasis added); 
The age of the witness. "[T]here is less risk of bolstering credibility if the witness 
is quite young as then the jury would likely view it as needed assistance."7 State 
v. Shanks, 644 N .W .2d 275, 278 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2002); 
5 Even the Kansas Supreme Court, though it adopted the New Hampshire approach, 
took the opportunity to identify factors that may impact on the district court's decision to 
allow a support person to accompany the witness. Rochelle, 298 P.3d at 300. The 
factors it identified are very similar to those identified in T.E. Compare id. with T.E., 775 
A.2d at 697-98. 
6 For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court found reversible error when the 
prosecutor gave the witness a doll to hold during her testimony. State v. Aponte, 738 
A.2d 117, 123-24 (Conn. 1999). However, the Court also noted that, had the witness 
brought her own doll from home, there would have been no error. Id. Thus, it was the 
fact that the prosecutor was the source of the support that turned a potentially-harmless 
situation into a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. See id. 
7 Even recognizing I.C. § 19-3023, the age of the witness is not a dispositive factor. 
The other factors present may reveal that a younger witness does not need the 
assistance of a support person, while an older witness may be unable to testify without 
having some support. For example, error has been found in a case involving an eight-
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The nature of the testimony, and whether it would be likely to cause "fear, 
embarrassment, or an inabiiity to testify[.]" TE., 775 A.2d at 697; 
The extent of the trauma, if any, caused by the underlying incident and the 
courtroom experience; 
Whether alternatives to having the support person present are available, such as 
allowing more frequent recesses so that the witness might regain her composure, 
if it becomes necessary, or allowing the witness to testify by closed-circuit 
television; 
The placement of the support person in the courtroom. "For example, if the 
support person was sitting unidentified in the public section of the courtroom, the 
influence would be minimal, if any. In contrast, the closer the support person is 
located to the victim-witness, the higher the risk the jury might be influenced. 
When the support person has physical contact with the victim, the risks of 
improper influence can be higher [still]." Patten, 9 Cal.App.4th at 1732; 
year-old witness because the record did not indicate that witness needed the support 
person in order to give effective testimony. Rulona, 785 P.2d 615; see also Santos 
2014 WL 7399262 (vacating the defendant's conviction for sexual abuse of a minor 
(actual age not disclosed in the opinion) because there was no evidence that the victim-
witness needed the support person to give effective testimony). On the other hand, 
there was no error in a case where a seventeen-year-old witness was accompanied by 
a support person because she was unable to give intelligible answers to the questions 
without the support person's presence. United States v. Brown, 72 M.J. 359, 362 
(C.A.A.F. 2013); see also Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 674-75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1975) (allowing a support person to sit with a twenty-one-year-old witness after she 
almost fainted on the stand). Thus, while age of the witness may be an important factor 
that weighs in favor of using a support person, other factors may show that doing so 
would impermissibly prejudice the defendant and violate his constitutional rights. In 
such a case, the support person should not be used, even if the witness is a child. See 
I.C. § 19-3023 (recognizing the interplay of these competing interests and the fact that 
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is the most important interest, and so, 
will trump the other interests). 
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Whether the support person has already testified. If the support person has 
already testified that they support the witness, then their presence during the 
witness's testimony will be more likely to be construed simply as for support, 
rather than inappropriately vouching for the witness; 
The nature of the theory of defense. In a case where the witness's credibility is 
crucial, the support person's presence is more likely to improperly influence the 
jury; 
Whether other evidence speaking to the witness's credibility has been presented; 
Whether the trial court gave a cautionary instruction to the support person to 
avoid reacting to the witness's testimony or giving cues to the witness or jury; 
'Nhether the support person was actually doing anything, "such as crying, 
nodding the head, hand motions, etc.,·· that might influence the jury. Patten, 9 
Cal.App.4th at 1732. It is also important to remember that such reactions or cues 
could be given by the support person subconsciously; and 
Whether the trial court gave an instruction, preferably a contemporaneous 
instruction, to the jury to disregard the support person's presence and to decide 
the case on the facts, rather than emotion or sympathy. Compare Larsen, 123 
Idaho at 460. 
See, e.g., TE., 775 A.2d at 697-98; Patten, 9 Cal.App.4th at 1731-32; Santos, 2014 WL 
7399262, **3-6. 
It is worth noting that I. C. § 9-1806 identifies several of these same factors as 
relevant to the determination of whether to allow a child witness to testify in an 
alternative manner to live testimony before the finder of fact. It includes the catchall 
provision, allowing the district court to consider "[a]ny other relevant factor." I.C. 
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§ 9-1806(7). This decision to allow the district courts the ability to identify unique, 
relevant factors in the specific case it is considering further demonstrates that the 
second test identified in Santos is the most consistent with Idaho law, and so, should be 
adopted by this Court. 
Applying that test to this case,8 it is clear that the district court abused its 
discretion by allowing Ms. Lee to sit with A.P. during A.P.'s testimony, even considering 
the instructions in I.C. § 19-3023. Notably, there was no showing, nor does the record 
support a finding, that A.P. was likely to be "substantially non-responsive" without the 
support person or that the support person's presence was likely to allow her to provide 
meaningful and probative testimony. Rather, all indications were that A.P. was able to 
give responsive testimony without Ms. Lee sitting behind her. Compare State v. Devon 
0., 90 A.3d 383, 405-06 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (finding error in allowing a therapy dog 
to accompany the child-witness during testimony because there was no indication that 
the witness was uncomfortable actually giving testimony against the defendant and 
other, less prejudicial measures had been ordered by the trial court to facilitate the 
witness's effective testimony), certif. granted, 100 A.3d 402.9 
At eleven years old, A.P. was not so young that the jurors would see Ms. Lee's 
presence or the presence of any support person as necessary to facilitate her coherent 
testimony. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court found reversible error where a 
witness who was in the fifth grade (A.P. was in sixth grade (Tr., Vol.2, p.226, Ls.18-19)) 
8 In fact, the abuse of the district court's discretion is clear under any standard because 
it considered nothing other than A.P.'s age. 
9 Similar to Santos, it is not relevant here whether the Connecticut Court of Appeals' 
decision in Devon 0. is upheld on review. The opinion is simply cited as another 
example of a learned court engaging in a reasoned consideration of the same issue 
now on appeal in this case, a consideration in which Mr. Mercado urges this Court to 
join. 
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was allowed to carry a doll while testifying because there was no indication that she 
needed the doll, and it was used instead as a ploy to stir up the jurors' emotions. State 
v. Gevrez, 148 P.2d 829, 833 (Ariz. 1944). Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals 
noted "the court vvas clearly concerned about a child over the age of 11 holding a teddy 
bear while on the witness stand'' when it stated, in dicta, '"[i]t is unlikely, on retrial, that 
other alleged errors will recur, particularly the child victim's carrying a 'Teddy Bear' 
onto the witness stand while testifying."' State v. rfakimi, 98 P.3d 809, 811-12 
(\Nash. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting and explaining State v. Harper, 670 P.2d 296, 301 
(Wash. Ct. App. ·t 983). As both of those cases indicate, a witness of eleven years is 
not so young as to need support while testifying. 
This analysis actually tracks with Idaho's overall statutory scheme regarding the 
testimony of child witnesses. Idaho Code § 19-3023 notes that a child may have a 
support person present. In the very next code section, the Legislature addresses 
additional protections for the testimony of children, specifically, children under the age 
of ten. I.C. § 19-3024 (allowing testimony of children under ten to be presented even 
though that testimony would normally be inadmissible under other statutes or rules of 
evidence). Thus, the Idaho Legislature has recognized that, as children pass the age of 
ten, their testimony is in less need of this sort of additional protection. 
Furthermore, A.P. had been able to confront Mr. Mercado twice before without 
undue problems. She had also been able to recount her version of events to various 
doctors, nurses, and police officers without any notable trouble in the telling. (See, e.g., 
Report of Alisa D. Ortega, NP, dated 1/7/14, attached to PSI, no page number provided; 
Report of C. Travis Criddle, dated 12/29/13, entry time stamped 18:17, attached to PSI, 
no page number provided.) In fact, two of those people noted that, not long after 
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recounting the events of the alleged incident to these strangers, A.P.'s demeanor was 
"relaxed" and/or "happy.,, (Supplemental Report of Thomas Mogolich, dated 12/30/13, 
attached to PSI, p.2; Report of Erin Craig, dated 1/3/14, no page number provided.) All 
this evidence demonstrates that A.P. did not need Ms. Lee sitting behind her to give 
meaningful testimony. 
More troubling, there is no indication that the district court judge considered 
alternatives to allowing Ms. Lee to sit on the stand with A.P. Compare Cliff, 116 Idaho 
at 924; see LC. § "l 9-3023 (requiring the district court to balance the impact of using the 
support person against the impact on the defendant's constitutional rights). In fact, the 
district court allowed Ms. Lee, a representative of the prosecutor's office, to accompany 
A.P. to the stand despite having already allowed A.P. 's parents to be present in the 
courtroom. This decision jumps from one of the least prejudicial options for allowing 
for a support person to be present, both in terms of the identity of the support person 
and the placement of that person in the courtroom, to one of the most prejudicial. 
The impact of allowing A.P.'s mother, who had already testified in support of A.P.'s 
version of events, to be the support person would have been minimal. See Patten, 
9 Cal.App.4th 1731-32. 
This is also why this Court should offer guidance on how to evaluate I.C. 
§ 19-3023's list of potential support persons: "parents, a counselor, friend or other 
person having a supportive relationship with the child." There is no indication in the 
record, nor is there an offer of proof, that Ms. Lee had any preexisting "supportive 
relationship" with A.P., as required by that statute. (See generally Tr., Vol.2, p.222, L.15 
- p.225, L.12.) In fact, this record actually indicates that there was not a relationship, 
since the prosecutor moved to have a different victim coordinator sit with A.P. during her 
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testimony at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.2, Ls.2-3 (the prosecutor requesting 
that Dee Enokson be allm,ved to sit with A.P. during her testimony).) Contrarily, the 
impact of using the prosecutor's victim coordinator was high. Therefore, this Court 
should offer guidance to the district courts for evaluating when and whether to allow for 
the more prejudicial alternatives identified in I.C. § 19-3023, particularly in cases were a 
less prejudicial alternative is available. 
Furthermore, Ms. Lee was placed between the judge and A.P., which means that 
the judge could not effectively monitor Ms. Lee to ensure that she was not subtly or 
subconsciously reacting to A.P.'s testimony in such a way that would inappropriately 
affect the jury. This is particularly troubling because the district court did not instruct 
Ms. Lee to avoid making such reactions or giving such cues during A.P.'s testimony. 
Worse still, despite choosing to allow this more prejudicial situation, the district court did 
not instruct the jury to disregard Ms. Lee's presence. Compare Larsen, 123 Idaho at 
460. 
The district court's decision was also problematic because the theory of defense 
called A.P.'s credibility into question. Notably, during cross examination, A.P.'s mother 
admitted A.P. had lied to school officials and agents of the Department of Health and 
Welfare. (Tr., Vol.2, p.192, Ls.7-20.) Therefore, allowing a representative of the 
prosecutor's office to sit with A.P. during her testimony was more problematic because it 
was more likely to be understood as vouching for A.P.'s testimony rather than merely 
facilitating the testimony. Compare State v. Aponte, 738 A.2d 117, 124 (Conn. 1999). 
Only three of the factors potentially weigh in favor of the district court's decision: 
A.P.'s age, the admittedly potentially-embarrassing nature of the testimony, and the fact 
that there was other evidence upon which the jury could weigh A.P.'s credibility 
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(namely, her mother's testimony). However, as to A.P.'s age, as discussed in note 5, 
supra, her age was not so overwhelming a factor that it alone justified this particularly 
prejudicial procedure, especially when another, much less prejudicial alternative was 
available. 
As to the nature of A.P.'s testimony, A.P.'s ability to recount the same subject 
matter to various doctors, nurses, and police officers without notable trouble reveals 
that, for this witness, there was no need for the support person's presence to cope with 
the subject matter of the testimony. Therefore, based on the facts of this case, that 
factor carries little, if any, weight. 
As to the other evidence of A.P.'s credibility, this case still came down to whether 
the jury believed A.P. or Mr. Mercado. Therefore, while that factor would potentially 
mitigate against the prejudice caused by Ms. Lee's presence on the witness stand 
during A.P.'s testimony, the prejudice arising under the other factors, such as that, as a 
representative of the prosecutor's office, she would appear to be vouching for A.P.'s 
credibility. This outweighs the minimal benefits Ms. Lee's presence gave to A.P. 
Compare Cliff, 116 Idaho at 924; see I .C. § 19-3023. 
Basically, nearly all the factors indicate that the district court's decision to allow 
Ms. Lee, as opposed to other available options, to sit with A.P. during A.P.'s testimony 
was an abuse of its discretion. Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Mercado's 
conviction because it came about through a violation of his right to a fair trial. 
C. Alternatively, This Court Should Remand This Case So That The District Court 
Might Evaluate Its Decision While Considering All The Proper Factors 
Mr. Mercado recognizes that the district court made its decision to allow Ms. Lee 
to sit with A.P. during A.P.'s testimony without the benefit of a full exploration and 
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explanation of the scope of its discretion in such matters from Idaho's appellate courts. 
Therefore, should this Court determine that the proper remedy is to remand this case so 
that the district court might reconsider its decision with the benefit of such guidance, he 
requests that this case be temporarily remanded pursuant to I.A.R. 13.3 so that the 
district court might reach a decision after giving this issue proper consideration. 
D. Even Considering This Case Only Under The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Prior 
Decisions, The Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion Is Clear 
Even if this Court decides not to provide guidance to the district courts in terms of 
the scope of its discretion on this issue, it should still vacate Mr. Mercado's conviction. 
Idaho Code § 19-3023 and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions reveal that, in order to 
properly allow a support person to be present, the district court needs to consider the 
prejudice the proposed support person would have and take steps to prevent that 
prejudice from impacting on the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
For example, in Larsen, the district court instructed the jury to not give the 
witness's testimony any different weight based on the support person's presence. 
Larsen, 123 Idaho at 460. The district court in Mr. Mercado's case gave no such 
instruction to the jury. As such, there was no actual mitigation of the impact Ms. Lee's 
presence had on the jury. There is not a question of whether there was improper 
impact, but rather, a matter of how much improper impact Ms. Lee's presence had. 
The district court in Larsen also adapted the procedures it did allow when it 
became apparent that the witness was losing the ability to give meaningful testimony. 
Id. Unlike the district court in Larsen, the district court in this case did not mold the 
procedures to match the needs of this witness. Rather, despite this witness's lack of 
need for support, the district court abandoned the less prejudicial alternative that it had 
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already allowed (allowing A.P.'s mother to remain in the public section of the courtroom) 
without considering A.P.'s ability to continue giving meaningful testimony without 
Ms. Lee's presence. Since there was no indication, either before A.P. took the stand or 
during her testimony, that she was not able to give meaningful testimony, the district 
court's decision to allow Ms. Lee to sit with A.P. on the stand does not fall within the 
scope of the district court's discretion. 
Similarly, in Cliff, the district court sought to use the least prejudicial means 
available for accommodating the witness. Cliff, 116 Idaho at 924. As the Court of 
Appeals pointed out, "the court must strike a balance between the defendant's right to a 
fair trial and the witness's need for an environment in which he or she will not be 
intimidated into silence or tears." Id.; see also I.C. § 19-3023. A.P. certainly was not 
intimidated into silence, nor does the record reflect that her testimony was affected by 
overpowering emotion. Therefore, there was no need, as there was in Cliff, for any 
such action to be taken that would risk depriving Mr. Mercado of his right to a fair trial. 
However, the abuse of the district court's discretion is obvious from the fact that it did 
not choose to use the least prejudicial alternative available. It actually forsook the least 
prejudicial alternative in favor of a far more prejudicial option. As such, its decision 
does not fall within the scope of discretion defined in Cliff either. 
Furthermore, since there is no indication or offer of proof that Ms. Lee had a 
"supportive relationship," or indeed, any relationship at all, with A.P., she was not one of 
the people who could serve as a support person under I.C. § 19-3023. Therefore, the 
district court's decision to allow Ms. Lee to accompany A.P. during A.P.'s testimony was 
beyond the scope of I.C. § 19-3023 as well. 
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As such, even considering only Idaho's statutes and case law, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Mercado's conviction and remand this case for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mercado respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court remand this 
case so that the district court can reconsider its decision in a full and proper analysis. 
i /1 tL-t 
DATED this _LL_ day of March, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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